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Abstract
The present paper proposes a route to modal claims that allows us to infer to certain
possibilities even if they are sensorily unimaginable and beyond the evidential capac-
ity of stipulative imagining. After a brief introduction, Sect. 2 discusses imaginative
resistance to help carve a niche for the kinds of inferences about which this essay is
chiefly concerned. Section 3 provides three classic examples, along with a discussion
of their similarities and differences. Section 4 recasts the notion of potential expla-
nation in Lipton’s (Inference to the best explanation, Routledge, Abingdon, 2004) in
order to accommodate inferences to possibility claims; Sect. 5 then attempts to charac-
terise a principle underlying such inferences. Section 6 concludes by discussing how
the proposal relates to other modal epistemologies, with emphasis on the potential of
such inferences to produce genuinely new ideas.
Keywords Imaginative resistance · Thought experiments · Perception · Time without
change · Turing test · Absolute space · IBE · Abduction
If we had to travel to other possible worlds to learn what goes on there, we
could know nothing about uninstantiated possibilities or necessities; for possible
worlds are not foreign countries or planets. Rather, they are alternative complete
universes and so are physically inaccessible. Nevertheless, there are standard
patterns of inference entitling us to infer facts about ways things could be—about
other possible worlds. (Sorensen, Thought Experiments (1992, p. 77))








It is common in philosophy to appeal to imagination for evidence concerning what
is possible. Hart, (1988) and Yablo, (1993) have suggested a compelling analogy
to make sense of this: Imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual.
There are limits to the justificatory force of imagination, however. While, for many,
the imagination has an exalted status as a window to the possible, an appeal to the
imaginability of a certain event or type of entity falls flat if one’s interlocutors find
themselves unable to conjure up scenarios or worlds as they are asked. Moreover,
should they succeed in doing so, they may yet doubt the strength of the supposed
connection: imaginationmay be a guide to modal space, but, like perception—perhaps
even to a greater extent—it is fallible.
Disputes about what is imaginable thus seem particularly prone to dialectical stale-
mate. Since we cannot peer into others’ minds and inspect the contents, the best we
can do is call a draw, or, perhaps worse, bemoan our rivals’ limited horizon—or their
attachment to claims beyond the bounds of sense, as the case may be. We might
go a little further, and offer an error theory, expounding on the source of their false
claims, but for the purpose of convincing them to change their minds, this puts the
cart before the horse, since such an explanation assumes, hence does not prove, that
the interlocutor is wrong about what they can imagine.
This paper explores connections between imagination and perception, with regard
to the limits of each, and particularly with regard to the capacity of the former to
resolve philosophical disputes where imaginative failure is a factor. We do not limit
ourselves to perception when investigating the actual world: we can also construct
theories, and believe some of these theories when they do a good job of accounting
for what we perceive. Extending the perception-imagination analogy, then, we can
also construct theories about imagined phenomena. Might theorising about imagined
phenomena provide justification for belief in possibilities which themselves lie beyond
the reach of imagination? I argue that this is so. That is not to say that imagination
and perception are perfectly analogous—I grant that imagination may well be more
fallible, and, as I say, particularly apt to lead to disagreement, certainly in matters
of metaphysics. It is perhaps in the nature of metaphysics, if not philosophy more
generally, to deal with the putatively unobservable; so, to the extent that imagination
is tied to perception, and that metaphysics deals in possibilities, metaphysics has a
particular interest in means of justification that transcend imagination.
To this end, I aim to make space for a type of inference that utilises imagination in
order to go beyond it. I adopt the widespread assumption that imagination can furnish
modal knowledge; that is, I am not addressing the global modal sceptic; rather, the aim
is to legitimate a type of inference that may be utilised in particular instances when
imagination runs aground. With this in mind, the next section (Sect. 2) discusses in
general terms the kind of dialectical context in which such inferences may be appealed
to.
Section3provides three classic examples of such inferences, alongwith a discussion
of their similarities and differences. Section 4 recasts the notion of potential explana-
tion in Lipton’s, (2004) in order to accommodate abductive inferences to possibility
claims; Sect. 5 then attempts to characterise a principle underlying such inferences.
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Section 6 concludes by considering the potential for such inferences to produce gen-
uinely new ideas. Comparing Hanrahan’s, (2007) explanationism will bring out the
need to acknowledge that such inferences are not equipped to deal with the modal
sceptic who denies the capacity of imagination to support even the most mundane of
modal claims; but if imagination is granted the potential to justify modal claims, I
contend that appeal to the best explanation of an imagined scenario has the potential
to justify the possibility of the unimaginable.
2 Failures of imagination
This paper takes it for granted that, in general, imagination is a guide to possibility.
However, the usefulness of imagination to this end is reduced to very little as soon as
any party to the debate in question claims to be unable to imagine the relevant scenario
or world. Such imaginative failure may stem from the nature of the entities in question,
the nature of imagination, or the nature of the interlocutor. This section explores the
limits of imagination qua justifier of possibility claims, in order to pave the way for
a novel way of circumventing these limits, such that certain possibility claims may
be justified in spite of imaginative failure. The aim here is to give a sense of how an
appeal to imagination can cease to be dialectically effective, without being discounted
as a guide to possibility in general terms—that is, both parties to the dispute regard
imagination as a guide, but a reason has been given as to why imagination fails in
a given case; in such a context, an inference drawn from imagined phenomena can
legitimately reach beyond the justificatory limits of sensory or stipulative imagination.
In her survey article on imagination, Gendler characterises imaginative resistance
as follows:
Imaginative resistance occurs when a subject finds it difficult or problematic to
engage in some sort of prompted imaginative activity. Suppose, for example, that
you were confronted with a variation of Macbeth where “the facts of [Duncan’s]
murder remain as they are in fact presented in the play, but it is prescribed in
this alternate fiction that this was unfortunate only for having interfered with
Macbeth’s sleep” (Moran, 1994). If you found it difficult to imagine this, even
though the author had done everything authors usually do to make such a story
fictionally true, thenyouwouldbe experiencing imaginative resistance. (Gendler,
2013, Sect. 5.2)
Gendler goes on to distinguish two ways of interpreting a philosopher’s claim to be
unable to imagine something, by way of two kinds of theory: “Can’t” theories, and
“Won’t” theories. Won’t theories involve the would-be imaginer being unwilling to
imagine something, for instance, “because doing so might lead them to look at the
(actual) world in a way that they prefer to avoid” (Gendler, 2013, Sect. 5.2). While it
is certainly possible for failure to imagine some phenomena to be a matter of the will,
I focus on can’t theory for two reasons: Firstly, a won’t theory brings with it a perhaps
uncharitable accusation of disingenuousness. And secondly, where a won’t theory
applies, it is perhaps appropriate for modal epistemology to give way to a discussion
of the would-be imaginer’s psychology.
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Can’t theories can then be separated into two broad categories, the simple and the
sophisticated.
Simple can’t theories often embrace some sort of impossibility hypothesis, sug-
gesting that propositions that evoke imaginative resistance are impossible in
the context of the stories where they appear, and that this explains why readers
fail to imagine them as true in the fiction. … Brian Weatherson (2004) offers a
more sophisticated version of a can’t theory, suggesting that resistance puzzles
arise in the face of a certain type of impossibility: they arise in cases where the
lower-level facts of the story and the higher-level claims of the author exhibit a
particular kind of incoherence. (Gendler, 2013, Sect. 5.2)
I submit that simple can’t theories are relatively toothless. There are two broad ways
in which an impossibility hypothesis might be justified by imaginative failure. The
first is where it is claimed that unimaginability entails impossibility. In the absence of
further substantive claims, this is implausible given that there are contingent limitations
on our imaginative capacities: failure to imagine a chiliagon does not imply that
corresponding objects are impossible (Gallois, 1974). The second is by way of an
inference to the best explanation, where it is claimed that the impossibility hypothesis
best explains imaginative failure. But in order for an inference to the best explanation
to be dialectically effective, the data to be explained must be accepted by those we are
trying to convince. Thus, for example, if Turing were to claim that thinking machines
are possible because he can imagine them, and his interlocutors claim that he must
be mistaken about the content of his imagining because such are impossible, we
have reached dialectical deadlock. We should also note that, even if all parties find
themselves unable to imagine something, an impossibility hypothesis would need to
beat out alternative explanations for this imaginative failure, such as fall under the
category of sophisticated can’t theories.
Sophisticated can’t theories perhaps have more bite, providing a principled rea-
son for imaginative failure. A sophisticated can’t theory along the lines suggested by
Weatherson, (2004) might proceed from a particular theory about what it is to imag-
ine something. According to Martin, (2002) for example (and presaged in Peacocke,
(1985) and Gallois, (1974)), “to imagine sensorily a ϕ is to imagine experiencing a ϕ”
(Martin, 2002, p. 404). This takes the link between (sensory) imagination and percep-
tion quite seriously, and has implications for the capacity of imagination to evidence
possibilities which would lie beyond any possible experience. Consider, for example,
the debate concerning whether time could pass in the absence of change, which we
will consider further below. In his article ‘Time without Change’, which furnishes one
of our paradigm cases to be considered below, Shoemaker notes that “it is plausible
to suppose that as long as one is aware of the passage of time some change must be
occurring, namely, at a minimum, a change in one’s own cognitive state” (Shoemaker,
1969, p. 367), and hence that “it is logically impossible … for someone to be aware
of the existence of a changeless interval during that interval itself” (Shoemaker, 1969,
p. 368). Hence, whereϕ is ‘a period of timewithout any change’, we are left with a cer-
tain incoherence, between the suggestion that one’s imagery is of time passing without
change, and a higher-level claim about what it is to imagine something. (Incidentally,
such incoherence would rival, qua explanation of imaginative failure, an impossibility
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hypothesis of the kind mentioned in the previous paragraph. While this may seem to
help the case for the possibility of time without change, it nonetheless, if successful,
blocks any simple argument from imaginability to possibility, by providing a princi-
pled reason why it cannot be imagined.) As a consequence of this account of sensory
imagination, if we are to imagine a world in which time passes without change, it must
be stipulation—as opposed to any sensory features of the imagining—that furnishes
the crucial properties.
However, as Kung, (2010) argues, the probative force of imagination is doubtful
where all the work is being done by supposition. Kung distinguishes two aspects of
imaginings: the assigned content and the basic qualitative content, which correspond
roughly to stipulated content and imagistic content, respectively. On Kung’s account,
there is a sense in which we can imagine impossibilities, but generally only where
the assigned content does all the work. This does not impugn the modal justificatory
force of imagination in general, because on Kung’s account, it is the basic qualita-
tive content of imagining that gives it its probative force. This is because the basic
qualitative content of an imaginative experience—just as that of a perceptual expe-
rience—presents a way that space could be filled around the perceiver (Kung, 2010,
p. 637).1 As such, failure to put together the qualitative content required to provide an
imagining with probative force can (in principle) be explained by the inconsistency
of the arrangement we are attempting to construct in our mind’s eye. In this way, the
explanatory potential of impossibility hypotheses is itself explained by way of a link
between imagination and experience. But there remains a sense in which we can imag-
ine impossibilities: for Kung, it is the stipulative aspect of imagining—the assigned
content—that all-too-easily permits the imagination of impossibilities, for “stipula-
tions and labels are virtually unconstrained, and what minimal constraints there are
have no modal epistemological value” (Kung, 2010, p. 634).2
As Peacocke, (1985, p. 19) points out, whether one is imagining a suitcase, or a
suitcase with a cat hidden behind it, may be determined not by the mental image itself,
but by the stipulations attached to it, namely, that there is a cat hidden from view. This
is of course an uncontroversial case, the imaginability or possibility of which nobody
could sensibly deny, but in other cases the coherence of an image with a stipulation
about it may be at the very centre of a philosophical debate. In many metaphysical
disputes, it is clear that imagery alone will not suffice to establish the coherence of
the possibilities in question, and in the context of a debate where such possibilities are
1 This echoes Yablo’s gloss on the imagination-perception analogy: “Just as someone who perceives that
p enjoys the appearance that p is true, whoever finds p conceivable enjoys something worth describing as
the appearance that it is possible” (Yablo, 1993, p. 5).
2 “[T]he principal constraint on assignments is certainty. I said that so long as we find P believable,
epistemically possible in the strongest sense that it is true for all we know for certain, or possibly true for all
we know for certain, we will be able to imagine P via stipulation or label. Let P be some proposition whose
possibility we are trying to establish via imagining. The mere fact that we find P (or possibly P) believable,
and hence are capable of making the assignments required to make P true in the imagined situation, is
not good evidence for P’s possibility. Believability just is lack of certainty. (Let us use ‘non-certainty’ to
denote lack of certainty; it avoids the unwanted connotations of ‘uncertain’.) It would be very odd if our
non-certainty counted as evidence of P’s possibility” (Kung, 2010, p. 634). The principle I advance in Sect. 5
takes stipulation’s lack of probative force into account when allocating its role, namely as a gap-filler for
uncontroversial details, the possibility of which will be granted by all parties in the debate at hand.
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doubted, stipulation, too, is bound to fail to convince. This paper aims to provide a way
of moving forward in such cases when imagination runs aground—as in cases where
all parties to a dispute allow that imagination can warrant belief in some possibilities,
but where there is disagreement on the imaginability of a given scenario, or on whether
an imagined world can be said to be one in which a particular proposition is verified.
Given thatwe cannot determinately imaginewholeworlds, therewill always be aspects
of imagined worlds the possibility of which is not settled by the act of imagining
alone; moreover, dialectical constraints are often in play: where there is a particular
disagreement about what can be imagined, some other method—besides asking one’s
interlocutor to imagine the ‘possibility’ up for debate—is needed. The next section
considers three well-known thought experiments, relating to the possibility of thinking
machines, of changeless passage of time, and of absolute space. These will provide
the basis for our later attempt to characterise a principle according to which possibility
claims lying beyond the evidential reach of imagination can be justified through an
appraisal of merely possible phenomena.
3 Inferring to possibility, from imagined phenomena
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a procedure whereby a shortlist of poten-
tial, mutually exclusive explanations of a given set of data is drawn up, and these
are compared in terms of ideological and ontological simplicity, explanatory power,
coherence with fundamental or well-established principles, internal coherence, etc.,
until it is determined whether there is one among these theories that can be said to
be the best of the bunch. If so, that theory is inferred to be true. Such a method is of
particular interest to scientific realists because it offers the potential to justify belief in
entities that cannot be directly observed; indeed, such entities might be said to be the
raison d’etre of IBE, for where observable entities are posited, the most secure way
to determine whether reality abides is to seek to observe them.
It might reasonably be said that it is in the nature of metaphysics to consider that
which lies beyond the senses, and in many cases—again, depending on the strength of
the imagination-perception connection—thatwhich cannot be conjured up by imagery.
If we grant the legitimacy of IBE as a route to belief in the unobservable, by way of
consideration of what can be observed, might we not do the same for possibilities
beyond simple confirmation by imagination, proceeding by way of that which can be
imagined?
There is a class of thought experiments which seek to do just that, which we will
consider by way of three exemplary cases.
Newton’s spheres: Imagine a world in which two spheres are joined by a cord. The
material of the spheres is such that neither attracts nor repels the other. The cord is
taut, and yet the spheres are not moving towards each other under the force of the cord.
What explains this set up, Newton proposed, is that the spheres are rotating—but with
respect to what? Not with respect to each other, for each retains its position relative to
the other throughout. And yet no other concrete objects have been posited as part of
the scenario; thus, to explain the phenomena so described, Newton proposes, we need
to posit absolute space. (Newton, 1966, p. 12).
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Shoemaker’s freezes: Imagine a universe divided into three populated regions, A,
B and C. The inhabitants find that each region undergoes periodic freezes, each freeze
lasting one year. They can come to know this because the local freezes are staggered:
by observations of clocks in unfrozen regions in the times before and after the freezes,
the inhabitants find that region A freezes for one year during every third year; region
B freezes for one year every fourth year; and region C freezes for one year every fifth
year. Having noticed this regularity of local freezes, they realise that if each individual
region continues to follow its observed pattern of freezes, then every sixtieth year
will be one in which all three regions are frozen (for all and only multiples of 60
are multiples of all three numbers, 3, 4 and 5). Since the three regions exhaust this
imagined universe, this would amount to a total freeze: every sixtieth year would be
one in which time passes without change. (Shoemaker, 1969, pp. 370–371).
Turing’s test: Turing, (1950) famously proposed a test for the presence of mind,
thought or intelligence in machines.
I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme comput-
ers, with a storage capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation game
so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance
of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. … I believe
that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will
have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without
expecting to be contradicted. (Turing, 1950, p. 442)
Putting aside the correctness of Turing’s predictions, and the demandingness of the
test he proposes, he is effectively claiming that, given that a computer could convince
us—the average interrogator—that it is humanmore often thannot,we should conclude
that it is possible for machines to think. While Turing is perhaps more concerned
about what will be the case, than he is about what could be the case, and about the
specific question aboutmachine intelligence, there seems to be amore general principle
underlying his test, such that the best explanation of some imagined phenomena is
itself possible3,4.
Each of these cases has its nuances. Turing describes an experiment that could
actually be performed—in principle, that is, for the computers existing at the time
Turing wrote these words were yet some way from the capacity he spoke of—whereas
both Newton’s and Shoemaker’s cases are of decidedly other-worldly phenomena.
Turing’s case also essentially involves an observer, the one playing the imitation game;
for Shoemaker’s case, we might omit the observers, while Newton’s world is crucially
desolate: in order to compel us to infer to the existence of absolute space, there needs
to be an absence of things with respect to which the spheres can be said to be rotating.
3 It appears that many have read Turing as claiming that winning the imitation game is a sufficient condition
for the presence of mind, a claim which is difficult to maintain in the face of thought experiments such as
Searle’s, (1981) “Chinese Room”. In this connection, it is interesting to note the probabilistic criteria that
Turing offers, of winning 70% of the time, suggesting a probabilistic guide to the presence of a mind. As
Oppy and Dowe, (2020, Sect. 4.4) note, this probabilistic aspect of Turing’s discussion is often overlooked.
4 Turing begins his paper “I propose to consider the question, “Can machines think?”” (Turing, 1950,
p. 433). While it is true that Turing talks of ‘replacing’ this question with another—namely, that of whether
a machine could win the imitation game—his proposed replacement is intended as a route to answering the
first modal question, which he returns to, and after all refers to as “the main question” (heading of Sect. 6).
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However, there is a common theme that needs exploring: the idea that an appeal to
merely possible phenomena—and what might reasonably be concluded from it—can
justify a claim about a possible world beyond what is conjured up by stipulative or
sensory imagination; can justify, in other words, belief in a possibility.
That this is what is going on is perhaps not so clear in Newton’s case. Newton
seems to move from the claim that absolute space must exist in order for us to make
sense of what happens in the two-sphere world, to the claim that it must exist in the
actual world. However, this seems unwarranted. Since the inference to the existence
of absolute space at the two-sphere world depends on features of that world which do
not pertain to the actual world, more needs to be said if the two-sphere world is to
provide us with any grounds for thinking that absolute space actually exists.5
However, what does seem reasonable is that, if indeed Newton has shown that
absolute space is part of the best explanation of the goings on at the two-sphere world,
then we should grant that it is possible for space to be absolute. This is an instance of a
kind of argument that can be particularly useful in contexts where the dispute is about
some possibility claim, and where an appeal to imagination, for one reason or another,
is ineffective. In Newton’s case, this may well be why thought experiments like the
two-sphere one are appealed to: it is not at all clear that absolute space can be imagined,
so appeal to imagination is ineffective against someonewho doubts its possibility. This
is in line with Brown’s, (2004) characterisation of the thought experiment.
Newton’s spheres do not so much give us a new result but, rather, give us a
remarkable phenomenon, something that needs to be explained. The thought
experiment establishes a phenomenon; the explanation comes later. And the
best explanation, according to Newton, is the existence of absolute space. This
way of looking at it is confirmed, it seems to me, by the way in which Berkeley
and Mach reacted to the thought experiment. They didn’t deny that rotation
with respect to absolute space is the best explanation for the tension in the
chord. Instead, they denied there would be any tension in the first place, if the
spheres are not moving together. Or the two spheres would move together, if
there were any tension. That is, they didn’t bother to challenge the explanation
of the phenomena that Newton posited; they challenged the alleged phenomenon
itself. (Brown, 2004, pp. 29–30)
To these remarks about Berkeley and Mach, we should also add that, had their strat-
egy been to challenge the explanation of the phenomena that Newton posited—say,
by providing an alternative explanation—this would amount to tacit acceptance of
5 What more needs to be said? Perhaps the bridging assumption is that the nature of space—relative
or absolute—is a matter of nomological or metaphysical necessity. In addition, an anonymous reviewer
proposes: “If it is about nomological possibility, then the possibility claim plausibly implies the actuality
claim. After all, if the imagined situation can only occur in absolute space and it can occur in the actual
world, then the actual world has absolute space.” The assumption here may be that matters of metaphysics,
such as whether space is absolute or relative, cannot affect whether some phenomenon is nomologically
possible; hence if the two-sphere scenario must involve absolute space, and is nomologically possible, then
so must every nomologically possible world (including, of course, the actual). However, if such further
reasoning is given to establish what is actual, it nonetheless proceeds from a claim about what is possible,




the general method of inferring possibility from an appraisal of merely possible phe-
nomena, the principle that the best explanation of some possible phenomenon is itself
possible.
In our other two examples, the concern is likewise, and perhaps more explicitly, to
establish a possibility claim: Shoemaker’s that time could pass without change, Tur-
ing’s that machines could think. In each case, this is done via an ampliative inference
from an appraisal of imagined evidence.6
Is such a method of argumentation legitimate? The question invites us to search for
a principle that abstracts from the particulars of each case, to see whether this type
of inference can withstand scrutiny. This will be useful for assessing the conclusions
drawn on the basis of the above cases, but the discussionwill also, I hope, be of broader
significance. What I am interested in is not merely the particular controversies of
each case—whether time could pass without change, whether machines could think,
whether absolute space is possible—but rather the method by which the philosophers
concerned attempted to weigh in on them.
One might think that such inferences must be counted as legitimate: once it has
been granted that IBE is a route to truth about actual phenomena, it is hard to see why
we ought not to draw abductive inferences about merely possible phenomena. After
all, in a sense, the imagination has an advantage over perception; as Sorensen notes:
Regular experiments need to be replicated, reviewed, and revisited. The mental
folding need not be repeated. Imagination gets the job done on the first try.
[…] There is no need to check for leaks, contamination, or procedural errors.
The thought experimenter harnesses the clean, renewable power of stipulation.
Imagination achieves the experimentalist’s ideal of control. (Sorensen, 2016:
p. 422)
Given the power to stipulate anything which one’s interlocutors are willing to grant
as possible without argument, we must be allowed to consider what an experiment
would show, were it carried out, given a particular set of results, and a consideration
of what would best explain a given set of results can be carried out without having
to actually undertake the experiment. But there is more work to do. The next section
recasts IBE in order to accommodate inferences to possibility claims; Sect. 5 then
attempts to characterise a principle underlying such inferences. Section 6 concludes
by considering the potential of such inferences to produce genuinely new ideas.
4 IBE for themodal realm
In his classic discussion of inference to the best explanation, Lipton, (2004) provides
a characterisation of this mode of inference that may seem to be at odds with the
idea that one can infer to a possibility claim on the basis that it would explain the
phenomena of some possible world. Operating on an assumption of inferential and
explanatory realism for much of the book, he says that “for something to be an actual
explanation, it must be (at least approximately) true” (Lipton, 2004, p. 57). Hence,
6 Further examples of such arguments are discussed in Oppy, (2004), and Parsons, (2013) offers one
explicitly modelled on Shoemaker’s, (1969).
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since competing explanations are typically mutually exclusive, “Inference to the Best
Explanation cannot be understood as inference to the best of the actual explanations”;
instead, Lipton suggests, we ought to distinguish actual from potential explanation
(Lipton, 2004, p. 57). Now a natural reading of ‘potential’ is one according to which it
entails possibility. As Lipton explains, “the potential explanations of some phenomena
are those that do explain them in apossibleworldwhere our observations hold” (Lipton,
2004, p. 59). However, if we are to allow abductive inferences to possibility claims,
choosing from a list of mutually exclusive candidate explanations, we need some
other way of cashing out ‘potential explanation’, for it would beg the question to
assume the possibility of all candidate explanations before the inference is drawn. For
a realist, a claim can’t be explanatory unless it is true; but IBE involves selecting from
candidate—i.e. potential—explanations. So how do we generate a list of candidate
explanations before determining what is a possible explanation?
Lipton’s understanding of IBE, as a selection from a list of candidates that each
explain our observations at some possible world, is equally problematic for Biggs’s,
(2011) abductive route to necessity claims, albeit for a slightly different reason. Biggs
argues that abductive principles can favour certain explanans over others where the
explanans in question are either modal claims, or else claims that entail modal claims
(beyond those less metaphysically interesting possibility claims that are entailed by
claims about what is actual). In the example Biggs gives, the explanandum is the
co-occurrence of water and H2O, and three potential explanations are offered:
(I) H2O is identical with water.
(M) H2Omerely metaphysically necessitates water—where ‘merely’ indicates
that the necessitation holds in only one direction.
(N) H2O merely nomologically necessitates water—where ‘merely’ indicates
that the necessitation is not metaphysical. (Biggs, 2011, p. 297).
As Biggs notes, these three potential explanations are mutually exclusive. If H2O is
identicalwithwater, as according to (I), thenwater andH2Ometaphysically necessitate
each other (assuming, that is, that property identities are metaphysically necessary).
Thus (I) rules out (M) because (I) has it that the necessitation goes in both directions,
while (M) has it that the necessitation holds in only one direction; and (I) rules out (N)
because (I) implies that the necessitation is metaphysical, not merely nomological.
Similarly, (M) and (N) rule each other out because they contradict each other on the
strength of the necessitation—metaphysical according to the former, and nomological
according to the latter.
That the competing candidate explanations are mutually exclusive is typical of an
abductive assessment (Lipton, 2004, p. 57). Less typical, however, is the strength with
which Biggs’s potential explanations exclude each other, for if any of (I), (M), or (N)
is true, then the other two candidates are each ruled out as possibilities.
Thus, if IBE is to justify modal claims—whether of possibility or necessity—it is
necessary to adopt an epistemic sense of ‘potential explanation’, where a proposition is
a potential explanation of xyz where, if—perhaps, for all we know, per impossibile—it
were true, itwould explain xyz.On reflection, however, this is perhaps how it should be.
That an impossibilitymight count as a potential/candidate explanation canbe seen from
cases where the impossibility is not yet known to be as such; where it is not yet known
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whether two things are identical or distinct, and assuming the necessity of identity,
their identity or distinctness might be central to candidate explanations of some facts
about them: for example, the non-identity of Batman and Bruce Wayne might explain
why they appear to have different voices. With this in mind, the requirement that all
candidate explanations must be metaphysically possible is too stringent.
5 Specifying the principle
It is difficult to see why we should not extend the reach of inference to the best
explanation in this way—why it should be legitimate with respect to actualia, but not
possibilia. Indeed, if such inferences are rejected in principlewith respect to themerely
possible, we need some principled reason for this, or else the legitimacy of inference
to the best explanation of actual evidence is threatened. If the best explanation of some
actual phenomenon is thereby considered actual, then the best explanation of some
possible phenomenon should therefore be considered possible. However, it remains
to formulate a principle characterising such a modal epistemology.
Yablo, (1993) provides a helpful starting point, where he considers a sense of
‘conceivability’, drawn from Putnam’s, (1975) critique of conceivability as a guide to
possibility, according to which “[t]o conceive a proposition… is to imagine acquiring
evidence that justifies you in believing it” (Yablo, 1993, p. 22). Putting aside doubts
about whether it can properly be called a sense of ‘conceiving’, this sounds rather
similar to what is going on in our three thought experiments, so perhaps this can help
us formulate a principle underlying them.
If I can imagine a scenario inwhich I am rationally persuaded of p, then p is possible.
But of course, thiswill not do, andYablo notes the fundamental flaw:we can imagine
being rationally persuaded of almost anything—including necessary falsehoods. Thus
this principle immediately falls to counterexamples. One such is familiar from the
work of Kripke and Putnam: if we grant that water is necessarily identical to H2O,
one can yet easily imagine being rationally persuaded that some watery stuff XYZ ( =
H2O) is water. Another kind might involve a possible agent relying on the testimony
of others: one can imagine the entire community of mathematicians testifying that
Goldbach’s conjecture has been proven; one can also imagine a world in which all
mathematicians testify that a proof has shown Goldbach’s conjecture to be false.
Assuming it is plausible to believe the testimony of experts (we can assume that they
are generally reliable in both cases), our first formulation tells us both that Goldbach’s
conjecture is possibly true, and possibly false.
Reformulating such a principle, then, we need to avoid approving inferences to pos-
sibility claims where there is a lack of relevant knowledge; we need to avoid imagining
ourselves into a world where we know less than we actually do—such imaginings are
unlikely to licence any new possibility claims. We might also note the importance of
agreement on the possibility of the imagined phenomena. Taking these considerations
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into account, we should substitute reference to the imagined for reference to pos-
sibilities, and rather than scenarios or phenomena, refer to worlds. It is worlds, not
scenarios, thatmake true possibility claims;moreover, referring toworldswill allow us
to avoid drawing inferences from underspecified situations. Kung’s (2010) aforemen-
tioned reservations about the probative force of stipulative imagining do not prevent
us from marshalling stipulation to fill out uncontroversial details (where the possi-
bility of the stipulated aspects is not doubted by either party to the debate), which is
just as well: we cannot hope for the qualitative content of our imaginings alone to
render the world imagined as determinate. As Yablo, (1993, p. 28) notes, we do not
(and perhaps cannot) determinately imagine all aspects of a scenario or world; but we
do imagine these as being determinate. This is crucial, in the first instance because
ampliative inferences about possible scenarios would be superfluous were we able to
simply imagine the possibility in question; and, in the second, because a determinate
claim can only be made true by a world that is determinate, at least in the relevant
respect.7
How much should be specified? Not everything about the world: this is impossible
in practical terms, but aside from this, inferences to possibility claims based on a world
about which everything is already stipulatedwould be dialectically useless. At the very
least, we need to avoid stipulating the truth of the proposition whose possibility is the
subject of debate. How do we arrive at the right degree of specification, such that the
world is not underspecified to the point where something relevant to our inference
is neglected, but that we do not overspecify to the point where those who doubt the
possibility of the proposition call us out for begging the question?
The key lies in our three cases: the propositions that they concerned themselveswith
were each plausibly beyond direct confirmation by experience. The imitation game
purports to test for thought, but would be otiose if this were the kind of thing one could
simply locate by observation; similarly, the passage of time could not be observed in
the absence of change—at the very least, noticing the passage of time plausibly must
involve change in one’s mental state; and as for the existence of absolute space, this
is of course something that cannot be confirmed by any of the senses.
My second attempt is:
If there is a possible world w at which the observable facts are such that it is
objectively reasonable to conclude that p is true at w, then we should conclude
that p is possibly true.
7 “To imagine an object as determinate is to imagine it as possessing the higher-order property … of
possessing a determinate property for each of its determinables. There is a world of difference, then,
between imagining an object as determinate—as possessing determinates for each of its determinables—and




By looking to observable facts8 on the left side of the conditional, we are explicitly
accommodating those who claim that only the observable is imaginable, and ensuring
that anything imagined here has a basis in qualitative imagining, to accommodate
Kung’s, (2010) claim mentioned above, that stipulative imagining lacks probative
force.9 Referring to a possible world, rather than an imagined one, draws on the
importance of agreement from both parties to the debate (even if imagination is the
source of this agreement). Claims making up the world referred to on the left of the
conditional must be agreed by both parties in the debate in question: the principle
has no bite unless such agreement is reached (as we saw above, Berkeley and Mach’s
refusal to grant Newton’s description of the case stopped his argument in its tracks).
And by the phrase ‘objectively reasonable’ I intend to cover inferences to the best
explanation, but only those that are drawn rationally, where all relevant facts have
been considered and the inference is not to the truth of “the best of a bad lot” (van
Fraassen, 1989, p. 143; Lipton, 2004, pp. 151–163). This parallels the actual practice of
drawing an inference to the best explanation: this can only be rational where one thinks
that they have considered all relevant evidence. We have also now omitted reference to
a possible observer,meaning our principle covers cases likeNewton’s two-sphere case,
which crucially lacked any objects other than the two spheres (another example might
be cases of putative distinct indiscernibles, which must lack a symmetry-breaking
observer).10
The problem here is that this tells us we ought to conclude that p is true even in
cases where we have not considered any such world. That is, the mere fact that w is a
possible world would require us to draw an inference about it, whether we have given
any thought to w and p or not! This can be remedied by amending the start of the
principle as follows:
8 What counts as observable facts here can be thought of as turning on what the qualitative contents of
our imaginings are. Whether these ought to include relatively high-level properties, such as being a cat,
or exclusively colour-at-location depends on one’s theory of perception. As we saw in Sect. 2, following
Kung, (2010), I distinguish qualitative from assigned contents, and take being a cat to fall under the latter
category. However, I admit that alternative theories of perception could make the principle less useful—for
instance, if one includes modal properties among the qualitative contents of percepts and imaginings, then
perhaps we need not go beyond experience or imaginings of machines to determine whether they could
think. The kinds of possibilities for which such inferences are useful are those for which confirmation
by experience alone fails; if the qualitative content of an imagining alone would settle the issue, then an
ampliative inference would be obsolete, as in the case of actual IBE and perception. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to provide a fleshed out theory of perception, I take it that the passage of time without
change, the presence of absolute space and thinking machine are not merely ‘observable facts’, i.e. things
which could be determined by looking.What is crucial for my purposes is that, when the principle is brought
to bear in a disagreement, both parties agree on the possibility of the case as it is described; stipulation can
play a significant role in fleshing out the case, but assuming that stipulation alone cannot determine what
is possible, any such stipulations should in principle be traceable to the stripped down, colour-at-location
qualitative content. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
9 Recall that, for Kung, qualitative imagining presents a way that space could be filled around the perceiver
(Kung, 2010, p. 637).
10 The goings-on in the two-sphere case can nonetheless be classified as “observable facts”—in the sense
that they involve concrete objects that would leave an impression, were there an observer there to see them;
it may also be permitted that a disembodied observer is present in the case, depending on the philosophical
beliefs of the interlocutor.
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If we consider that there is a possible world w at which the observable facts
are such that it is objectively reasonable to conclude that p is true at w, then we
should conclude that p is possibly true.
However, our principle is now rather trivial: it effectively says that, if we think that
we should conclude that p is true at w, then—since w is a possible world—we should
conclude that p is possibly true.
I therefore suggest that we characterise the three thought experiments with the
following principle:
If there is a possible world w at which the observable facts are such that it is
objectively reasonable to conclude that p is true at w, then p is possibly true.
Here ‘we should conclude that’ has been removed from the consequent, therefore
removing the need for restricting the principle to those worlds under our consideration.
At what cost? It may be said that, given that even idealised IBE is fallible, the epistemic
fact that it is objectively reasonable to conclude that p is true at aworld should not entail
the metaphysical fact that p is true at that world.11 In fact, this does not contradict
the principle as stated; I will return to this in the following paragraphs, but first,
a brief discussion of the supposed barrier to implication, from the epistemic to the
metaphysical. The phrase ‘objectively reasonable’ is intended to encode for rationally
drawn inferences to the best explanation (whereby hypotheses are compared by way
of principles of theory selection such as Occam’s razor) which are drawn from an
appraisal of all relevant facts, my assumption being that it is objectively reasonable to
infer to the truth of such an explanation. If the claim that a certain hypothesis is the
best among all other viable candidates is itself an epistemic claim, then the viability
of IBE more generally is threatened, for the latter involves not merely inferring to
a claim about what it is reasonable to believe; rather, it involves making the leap to
claims about what is the case, often in matters of ontology, and hence metaphysics.
Of course, it is a legitimate position to deny the validity of inferences to the best
explanation; my claim here is that, if we allow for inferences to the best explanation
based on an appraisal of actual goings on, then, provided certain conditions are met,
we should treat merely possible goings on similarly. I intend the stated principle to be a
normative one, but the normative aspect comes frommy saying that we ought to apply
the principle, which is premised on the norm of drawing IBEs based on appraisals of
actual phenomena. IBE is indeed fallible, and so there is no guarantee that the above
principle will turn up true possibility claims, just as there is no guarantee that IBE
will turn up truths about the actual world; nonetheless, one should apply the principle
provided one engages in the general practice of drawing abductive inferences.
The reader may have noticed that the right side of the principle affirms a possibility
without affirming it of the specific world imagined. It may have been expected that
such inferences would be about the specific world imagined, given what has been
said above about imagining our scenarios as part of complete worlds, and as being
determinate (in spite of not being determinately imagined). Thus, with our principle
so stated, in the case of the Turing test, the inference is to the possibility of thinking
11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this.
123
Synthese
machines—not to the claim that there is a thinking machine specific scenario/world
imagined. There are two reasons for characterising the principle in this way.
First, any such inference to a claim about a specific world could be said to be far
too unlikely to be warranted. As our cases involve ampliative inferences, the evidence
from which these inferences are drawn is consistent with the falsity of the conclusions
drawn. In the case of Shoemaker’s scenario, for example, it is entirely consistent with
the description of the case that there are in fact no periods of total freeze (which is
to say, that the regularity of the freezes in each region is reliably scuppered every
sixtieth year). To say that the best explanation of Shoemaker’s scenario is that there
is a year-long total freeze—a period of time without change—every sixtieth year may
not allow us to say, of any particular world conforming to Shoemaker’s description,
that it is likely that there is a total freeze. When reasoning about particular possible
worlds, we are effectively in barn-façade territory.12
Secondly, as noted, IBE is fallible—the best explanation need not obtain—and
so the fact that the best explanation of some phenomena at w is p should not entail
that p is true at w. To see why, consider that affirming, of any world conforming to
Shoemaker’s description, that it is a world in which there are periods of changeless
time (and likewise for the other two cases and their intended conclusions) would prove
too much. There is of course an infinite number of such worlds, varying in irrelevant
respects (such as the number of items in each region); while all such worlds may
differ from each other in any number of respects, each has its membership in that class
by conforming to Shoemaker’s stipulations. But, if we should say of each of these
worlds that time passes without change in that world, then, surely, we should say that
they are all worlds in which time passes without change. This conflicts with the fact
that the observable evidence in Shoemaker’s thought experiment is consistent with
there being no periods of changeless time.13 What I am proposing for possible worlds
is therefore weaker than IBE—strictly speaking, not to infer to the truth of the best
explanation at a particular world under consideration, but to the possibility of the best
explanation—its truth at some world conforming to the stipulations of the case.14
It is interesting to note that, given that such inferences are ampliative, the rationality
of concluding that p is possibly true does not depend on it being true at the world we
are considering. It does however need to be true at some world to count as modal
knowledge. This suggests that we can gain modal knowledge from a consideration of
worlds that make the proposition in question false: the justification of the proposition
and the truth of the proposition need not be contributed by the same worlds. Again,
with regard to the Turing test, this is how it should be: characterising the principle
as we have done allows us to claim that the presence of a thinking being is the best
12 Having said this,Biggs andWilson, (2017) have convincingly argued that the epistemic value of abductive
principles does not depend on whether theories satisfying these principles are more likely to be true.
13 Faraci, (2013) raises this problem, as a modal analogue of the lottery paradox, albeit with regard to a
different debate—concerning the objectivity of moral claims. Faraci proposes dropping the agglomeration
rule, such that asserting a, b, c, etc. should not force us to assert their conjunction. By inferring to possi-
bility—truth at some world—rather than truth at a particular world, I mean to avoid committing to this
move.
14 Nonetheless, IBE is a realist mode of inference—it moves from epistemic considerations to truth claims;
as such, the principle I have stated warrants inferences not merely to justified belief about modal space, but
to what that space includes.
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explanation for any case in which a machine passes the test, while leaving open the
possibility that a machine might win the imitation game—‘fooling’ the human—while
nonetheless not being a thinking being. This fits with an interpretation of the Turing
test thought experiment that doesn’t claim, implausibly, that winning the imitation
game entails that one is a thinking being.
6 Genuinely new ideas
In their introductory chapter to their Conceivability and Possibility volume, Gendler
and Hawthorne raise the following intriguing question: “can imagination/conception
enable us to gain access to genuinely new ideas? Or do they merely re-present, albeit
perhaps in a modified form, what we are already acquainted with through other means,
such as perception?” (Gendler & Hawthorne, 2002, p. 9). We have met the idea that
stipulation can be combined with sensory imagination, but as we saw, it is highly
questionable whether possibility claims arrived at in this way have any argumentative
force.
What about recombination more generally? Specifically, consider the principle of
recombination, which states “that anything can coexist with anything else, at least if
they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist
with anything else” (Lewis, 1986, p. 88). Behind this lies another plausible princi-
ple, the Humean dictum, that there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences. However, often modal disputes are primarily about whether certain things
really are distinct, where the possibility of separation cannot be presupposed with-
out question-begging (we see this, for example, in the debates over whether time =
change, or whether identity just is indiscernibility). In such cases, where the identity
or distinctness of some things is what is at issue, the principle of recombination offers
little help; for example, recombination cannot tell us whether time could exist without
change until we find out whether time and change are the same or distinct. In some
cases, we might appeal to imagination or conceivability to help us decide whether
some things are distinct, and then let the principle of recombination do its work. As
Schaffer has noted, “[r]ecombination and conceivability are interrelated. Part of the
justification for recombination is the conceivability of what results” (Schaffer, 2005,
p. 12). But one will only grant the conceivability of what results if one grants the
conceivability of the elements to be recombined. Thus there is a certain limit to the
capacity of recombination to resolve disputes about what is possible. It seems fair
to say that recombination counts as re-presenting, in a modified form, what we are
already acquainted with.
As I suggested above, my aim is to forward a modal epistemology that has the
capacity to extend ourmodal horizons, perhaps beyond the limits ofwhat can be upheld
by appeal imagination (whether sensory or stipulative) alone. In this connection, we
now turn to a comparison of what is perhaps the closest precedent, Hanrahan’s, (2007)
modal explanationism.
Hanrahan’s modal explanationism has it that we can justify claims about possible
worlds by thinking about possible evidence, evidence conceived of through the com-
bination of sensorial imagining and storytelling. In particular, the kind of evidence
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relevant to Hanrahan’s project consists in non-factive mental states; just as one can
have a bear represented to one’s mind without there actually being a bear there, when
one conceives of a possible perception as of there being a bear in one’s backyard, we
have not necessarily conceived of a possible world in which there is a bear in one’s
backyard. Possible percepts can be misleading, just as actual percepts can. This is
crucial, if the aim is to justify the claim that imagination is a guide to possibility, for
it would beg the question to assume that whenever we imagine a possible percept,
the world imagined is one in which that percept is veridical (Hanrahan, 2007, p .136,
p. 142).
Modal claims are then justified by comparing the merits of competing potential
explanations of possible percepts. Hanrahan asks us to consider her epistemic twin,
Rebecca, who has the same mental life as Hanrahan up to the point where Hanrahan
intentionally conjures up an image of a bear in her backyard; Rebecca, on the other
hand, has an image of a bear in her backyard come to her unbidden. Hanrahan herself
has recently heard that there was a bear sighting on someone’s porch, and she notes
that her neighbours keep many bird feeders stocked up with feed, and that this can be
a draw for bears.
Hanrahan argues that her epistemic twin is justified in taking her images as of a bear
to be veridical, and that this in turn justifies Hanrahan in believing that (B) A bear is in
Hanrahan’s backyard, is possibly true. It is argued that the mental state of Hanrahan’s
epistemic twin, and the account that the latter gives of that state, satisfy three require-
ments, sufficient to justify the epistemic twin in taking her mental representations as
of a bear to be veridical:
1. The account of that state as a veridical perception must possess all of the
epistemic virtues to a greater degree than any of the other accounts we could
have given of that state and it must also increase or at least preserve the
epistemic virtues of our best explanation over the long run.
2. The account of that state as a veridical perception must, of course, include or
imply that the state is a product of the normal workings of our senses which
accurately reflects the way the world is.
3. The state must be sensorial in nature and it must usually (though not always)
be highly forceful, vivacious, and determinate. (Hanrahan, 2007, p. 130)
Hanrahan justifies the satisfaction of requirements 1 and 2 as follows:
Now because Rebecca possesses nearly all the beliefs I possess, all the informa-
tion I have recently gathered about bears is available to her. Thus, I know that the
story she can tell about these images that best preserves the epistemic virtues of
her best explanation is one that deems them to be veridical perceptions. In this
story, this bear had in the past found a mound of birdseed to dine on in Rebecca’s
neighbor’s backyard. And this bear (being a creature of habit) returned to these
bird feeders (via Rebecca’s yard) to see if there was more that very morning as
Rebecca was looking out her back window. Thus, requirements 1 and 2 above
have been satisfied. (Hanrahan, 2007, pp. 137–138)
As for requirement 3, its satisfaction depends on how vivid Hanrahan’s own imagery
was, for, being epistemic twins, Hanrahan’s and Rebecca’s mental states are the same
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on this score. If it is granted that Hanrahan’s sensorial imagination of a bear in her
backyard is highly forceful, vivacious and determinate, then it must also be granted
that her (possible) epistemic twin’s mental representation of a bear also possesses
these qualities. But given that some people’s imaginations can manifest these qualities
to a high degree, we should grant the former point, and hence that 3 is satisfied by her
epistemic twin’s mental state (Hanrahan, 2007, pp. 138–139).
The next step in the argument is to show that, because Hanrahan’s epistemic twin
is justified in taking her mental state to be veridical, and thus in believing that there is
a bear in her backyard, Hanrahan is also actually justified in the claim that there could
be a bear in her backyard. Hanrahan does this by noting, first, that Rebecca is justified
in taking her image to be a veridical one, and, but for the fact that Rebecca’s image
came to her unbidden, they are epistemic twins; as such, it seems only reasonable
that Hanarahan would draw the same conclusion as Rebecca were the former in the
latter’s shoes. Secondly, Hanrahan notes that we have been given no reason to think
that Rebecca was intoxicated, or her vision obscured or impaired, or that there is a
holographic representation in her garden; and since Rebecca’s imagery comes to her
unbidden, it makes more sense to conclude that her mental state is veridical, than it
does to take it to be a product of her imagination, as Hanrahan’s was (Hanrahan, 2007,
pp. 140–141).
A significant point of analogy betweenHanrahan’s view and the present paper is that
both are concerned to circumvent what Hanrahan terms ‘the problem of adjudication’,
where competing theorists fail to agree onwhether something is imaginable or conceiv-
able—as happens in cases of imaginative failure, discussed above. A prominent case
is the claim that philosophical zombies are conceivable, and therefore possible—that
there is a possible world just like ours except that our counterparts are without con-
sciousness (Chalmers, 1996, p. 96). One may deny the intuition, or, alternatively but
to similar effect, one may have an intuition of something else that contradicts it. In an
example of the latter, Frankish (2007)mounts an argument against the conceivability of
zombies, from an intuition that conflicts with it: the conceivability of “anti-zombies”.
Anti-zombies are beings very much like zombies would be (if they were possible),
except that the purely physical facts about them necessitate their consciousness. But
there is no room in modal space for both zombies and anti-zombies, for, if the purely
physical features of anti-zombies necessitate their consciousness, they therefore make
any would-be zombies conscious too. Frankish suggests that the result is a stand-off,
and hence “that considerations of conceivability have little role to play in debates
about the nature of consciousness” (Frankish, 2007, p. 666).
Hanrahan’s claim is that adjudication is possible on modal explanationism, and not
possible on modal intuitionism. While in some cases disagreement may persist, on
which is the most fruitful, coherent, and simple theory, there will at least be some
cases where the abductive success of a theory is enough to overcome some original
misgivings about the concepts appealed to in that theory, or misgivings based on
the extent to which that theory coheres with previously held beliefs. That is, it is at
least possible for opposing parties to evaluate each other’s theory based on abductive
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criteria; it is not clear that the same can be said for apparently opposingmodal intuitions
(Hanrahan, 2007, p. 145).15
Another point of analogy between Hanrahan’s and my own route to possibility
claims is that we both assume some possibilities in order to infer others. With this in
mind, Hanrahan considers the following objection:
I want to justify my belief that B is possibly true. In order to provide myself with
this justification, I have made an assumption that I have tried to defend. But in
this defence, I have employed some of my beliefs about what is possible. For
example, my above argument depends on the claim that the images we produce
via our imagination could have come to us via an alternative pathway. So, I am
seemingly trapped in a circle. (Hanrahan, 2007, p. 141)
A similar objection might be put to me: in any argument from possible phenomena
to a possibility claim, the possibility of at least some of that phenomena must be
assumed. For example, in Shoemaker’s case of evidence for the possibility of time
without change, we must assume that his world of partial freezes (apart from whether
it is a world where every sixtieth year is one of total freeze) is itself possible.
Hanrahan responds that the circle is not a vicious one.
When we seek to establish that a proposition is possibly true, we need not start
from scratch, throwing out all of our modal beliefs. We only need to avoid
assuming the possibility of the proposition whose modal status is in question.
This I have done. (Hanrahan, 2007, pp. 141–142)
The trouble is that Hanrahan goes on to tentatively endorse a “limited skepticism
about possibility”, based on the limitations of her own modal epistemology, namely
that “[b]y design, it is radically ill-equipped to deal with possible worlds that are
radically different from this [i.e. the actual] world” (Hanrahan, 2007, p. 143). If the
suggestion is that we should be sceptical of modal claims that cannot be justified
by Hanrahan’s method, then it remains problematic that Hanrahan herself appeals
to such modal claims—in particular, the claim that the images we produce via our
imagination could have come to us via an alternative pathway (which forms part of
the scenario to be explained). One might think that the latter claim is justified by
everyday experience; but then why not say the same of other mundane modal claims
like the one that Hanrahan justifies using her method (that it is possible for there to be
a bear in her backyard)? As Hanrahan notes, the kinds of possibilities that Hanrahan’s
epistemology aims to justify are mundane, the possible inferences she refers to based
on “variations in our immediate surroundings” (Hanrahan, 2007, p. 143). Thus the
modal claims she takes for granted are on a par, as far as the need for justification
15 It should be noted here that Chalmers acknowledges the difficulty of adjudicating conceivability argu-
ments, “particularly where strange ideas such as these [i.e. zombies] are concerned” (1996, 99), and goes
on to offer alternative arguments against the logical supervenience of consciousness on the physical. It
should also be said that, while Chalmers finds the logical possibility of zombies “obvious” (1996, 96), he
goes beyond the mere affirmation of intuition, describing a system functionally isomorphic to that of a
consciousness-producing brain to provide indirect support for the possibility of physical replicas lacking
in consciousness (97). I would therefore not go so far as to say that adjudication is impossible for the
modal intuitionist: it is possible, provided they are willing to extend their argument in such ways—indeed,
explanationist considerations can be counted among these.
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is concerned, with those she seeks to justify. If the sceptic is suspicious of a claim
like “The image of a bear could have come to me by an alternative pathway”, then
any conclusions drawn therewith will be equally suspect; but if the interlocutor is not
so sceptical, then explanationism has no work to do—we could just as well infer the
possibility of a bear in the backyard from imagining it directly, rather than going to
the trouble of inferring to the best explanation of some imagined phenomena.
That iswhy I setmyprinciple up for use in dialectical contexts of limited imaginative
failure, rather than those in which the imagination is hardly admitted as a source of any
modal beliefs. I do not present my route to possibility claims as a general alternative,
to supplant all others,16 nor as an antidote to a general modal scepticism that would
challenge even the most mundane of modal claims; but in disputes where imaginative
resistance is a factor, appeal to possible evidence can make some headway where
simple appeals to imagination or modal intuition of the possibility in question are
inappropriate. If I make use of imagination to justify the possibility of some evidential
situation, I do not assume what is to be shown, for I do not aim to justify the claim
that imagination is a guide to possibility; thus I can, without circularity or redundancy,
appeal to imagination or modal intuition to make modal claims regarding possible
phenomena, in order to consider what conclusions it would be reasonable to infer.
Again, in terms of the kind of dialectic I have been concerned with, this makes sense,
for those who take imaginative resistance to be a barrier to justification of possibility
have effectively granted imagination as a guide; that is, the idea that imaginative
resistance is a barrier to the justification of a given modal claim presupposes that the
imagination would have provided some justification, were it successful.
To summarise, the context of general modal scepticism works both for and against
Hanrahan’s project: for, because it motivates explanationism—such scepticismmeans
that imagination is not enough, and even the most mundane of modal claims (namely,
‘There could be a bear in my backyard’) requires justification that goes beyond the
assumption that what is imagined is generally possible; but against, because in any
argument from explanation, the explanandum must be granted—yet any context in
which a modal claim as mundane as ‘There could be a bear in my backyard’ is treated
with scepticism will be one in which ‘The image of a bear could have come to me
unbidden’ is equally suspect. By contrast, the kinds of inferences which I am advo-
cating are inherently ambitious, tending towards claims that may not be reachable
by other means. I take it for granted that perception can be a guide to actuality, and
imagination a guide to possibility; after all, IBE needs raw data to draw from (though
there is plenty of room for disagreement about the extent of imagination’s reach—one
may be more inclined to grant the possibility of Turing’s case than Shoemaker’s, the
latter requiring physical goings on quite alien to what we find in actuality). In any case
where a hypothesis could be confirmed by observation, it would make sense to strive
towards such observations; it is with respect to that which cannot be otherwise verified
that IBE is often most appropriate. Similarly, where a possibility claim can be justified
by imagination, it is to imagination that we should turn; it is where imagination falters
that I find the perception-imagination analogy to be most intriguing: if IBE, operating
16 Thus I can be said to be, in Wirling’s, (2020) terms, a non-uniformist about modal epistemology.
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with actual phenomena, can transcend the limits of perception, then perhaps, operating
with merely possible phenomena, it can similarly transcend the limits of imagination.
7 Conclusion
Kripke famously claimed that “[g]enerally, things aren’t ‘found out’ about a counter-
factual situation, they are stipulated” (Kripke, 1981, p. 49); “[p]ossible worlds’ are
stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes” (Kripke, 1981, p. 45). It has also
been suggested (blocking the inference of necessity from a priority, as in the knowl-
edge argument for property dualism) that one cannot legitimately draw metaphysical
conclusions from epistemic premises (Kripke, 1981, p. 36). Concomitant to its poten-
tial to expand our conceptual horizons, a modal epistemology that warrants ampliative
inferences from possible phenomena to possibility claims would represent a departure
from these assertions. New concepts are naturally faced with scepticism, but may gain
acceptance as they figure in theoretically virtuous explanations. We can see Turing’s
test, for example, as attempting to break free from conceptual arguments, by showing
that an alternative concept of machines (as things that could think) is involved in the
best explanation of certain possible data. This idea that theory success is a source of
concept advancement is captured by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World:
A good theory isn’t merely likely to be true. Its ideology is also likely to carve
at the joints. For the conceptual decisions made in adopting that theory – and
not just the theory’s ontology – were vindicated; those conceptual decisions also
took part in a theoretical success, and also inherit a borrowed luster. So we can
add to the Quinean advice: regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at
the joints. (Sider, 2011, p. 13)
In this way, explanation can play a crucial role, for sensory imagination and stipulation
would lack probative force in a dialectic where not just the imaginability of a world
verifying a proposition is in doubt, but also where the legitimacy of a certain concept
is a point of contention. To give a striking example from the history of philosophy and
science, Locke was dismissive of the notion of action at a distance in earlier editions
of his Essay, but revised his attitude in light of the success of Newton’s theory of
universal gravitation. Interestingly, he nonetheless maintained that action at a distance
was beyond his comprehension, but granted its possibility in spite of this. In a letter
to Stillingfleet, he wrote:
It is true, I say, “that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else”. And so I thought
when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation. But I am since
convinced by the judicious Mr Newton’s incomparable book, that it is too bold a
presumption to limit God’s power, in this point, by my narrow conceptions. The
gravitation of matter towards matter, is not only a demonstration that God can, if
he please, put into bodies, powers and ways of operation, above what can be derived
by our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter, but also an
unquestionable and everywhere visible instance, that he has done so. And therefore
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in the next passage of my book I shall take care to have that passage rectified (Locke,
1823, Volume 4, pp. 467–8)
Scientists need to consider what their experiments would show, if certain conditions
were met and certain underdetermining results were obtained. It is likely that in some
cases there will be imaginative failure regarding the phenomena being tested for.
Locke’s claim that action at a distance cannot occur because it is inconceivable, revised
upon considerationof the success ofNewton’s theoryof universal gravitation, is echoed
in the development of quantum mechanics, where theory success perhaps outstrips
our powers of conception. In some cases, there may be contingent limitations on the
capacity to design or execute experiments that have nothing to do with the truth of
the proposition per se (just as our inability to conjure up imagery corresponding to a
chiliagon has nothing to do with the possibility of thousand sided objects); in other
cases, there may be necessary limitations on the capacity to execute experiments that
may have nothing to dowith the possibility of the proposition per se (as we noted in the
cases of Shoemaker’s freezes and Newton’s spheres). Inference to the best explanation
of imagined phenomena can enable us to determine what is possible, in the face of
imaginative resistance. Just as a scientific realist will draw inferences to claims about
unobservables, similar patterns of reasoning can allow us to reach beyond sensory
imagination, and beyond the dialectical limits of stipulation, to justify possibility
claims about the unimaginable.
This is all to carve out a niche for inferring to the possibility of the best explana-
tion of imagined phenomena. Specifically, this is appropriate in a discussion where
imagination is assumed to provide evidence for possibility in general, but where there
is a principled reason why the target phenomenon either cannot be imagined, or can,
but only in such a way that provides no evidence for possibility (as in the case where
stipulation does all the work); in other words, it is useful where the imaginability of
the phenomena under scrutiny is part of what is at issue, such that appeal to its imagin-
ability would be dialectically inappropriate. These points are related, for in the context
of a debate about a possibility where imaginative resistance is a sticking point, there is
likely to be tacit acceptance of the idea that imagination is a guide to possibility: were
it imaginable, this would have favoured the case for its possibility. Returning to the
perception-imagination analogy, we might also note that unobservability is analogous
to unimaginability. Thus, just as scientific realists allow inferences to reach beyond
what can be directly confirmed by perception—that is, to the unobservable—by draw-
ing ampliative inferences based on imagined phenomena, we can reach beyond what
can be shown directly by imagination, beyond the sensorily imaginable. Thought
experiments like our three cases do not depend on the imaginability of what they aim
to demonstrate, and therefore offer a way of moving the debate forwards, beyond the
impasse of disagreement about what is imaginable.
Acknowledgements Thanks to three anonymous referees and the editors for very helpful comments. Many
of the ideas contained in this paper were developed during my time as a student at St Andrews and Arché
and I am grateful to the philosophical community there for their innumerable discussions and feedback, as
well as support from the AHRC and a Royal Institute of Philosophy Jacobsen Fellowship. Special thanks




Biggs, S. (2011). Abduction and modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2), 283–326.
Biggs, S., & Wilson, J. (2017). The a priority of abduction. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 735–758.
Brown, J. R. (2004). Why thought experiments transcend experience. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary
debates in philosophy of science (pp. 23–43). Malden, Mass: Blackwell.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford University Press.
Faraci, D. (2013). Brown on mackie: Echoes of the lottery paradox. Philosophia, 41, 751–755.
Frankish, K. (2007). The anti-zombie argument. Philosophical Quarterly, 57, 650–666.
Gallois, A. (1974). Berkeley’s master argument. The Philosophical Review, 83(1), 55–69.
Gendler, T. (2013). Imagination.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013Edition), EdwardN.
Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=imagination
Gendler, T. S., & Hawthorne, J. (2002). Introduction. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability
and possibility (pp. 1–70). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hanrahan, R. (2007). Imagination and possibility. Philosophical Forum, 38(2), 125–146.
Hart, W. D. (1988). Engines of the soul. Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, S. (1981). Naming and necessity. Blackwell.
Kung, P. (2010). Imagining as a guide to possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3),
621–663.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation. Routledge.
Locke, J. (1823). The Works of John Locke, a new edition, corrected, ten volumes. London.
Martin, M. G. F. (2002). The transparency of experience. Mind & Language, 17(4), 376–425.
Moran, R. (1994). The Expression of feeling in imagination. The Philosophical Review, 103(1), 75–106.
Newton, I. (1966). (Principia), Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. F. Cajori. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press (original work published 1687).
Oppy, G. (2004). CanweDescribe Possible Circumstances in whichwewouldHaveMost Reason to Believe
that Time is Two-Dimensional?. Ratio (new series) XVII 1 March 2004: 67–83.
Oppy, G., & Dowe, D. (2020). The Turing Test. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/turing-
test/>.
Parsons, J. (2013). The Earth and the Aleph. Manuscript. Available at https://philpapers.org/archive/
PARTEA-3.pdf . Accessed 28/12/20.
Peacocke, C. (1985). Imagination, experience and possibility: A Berkeleian view defended. In J. Foster &
H. Robinson (Eds.), Essays on Berkeley (pp. 19–35). Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers ii. Cambridge University Press.
Schaffer, J. (2005). Quiddistic knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 123(1–2), 1–32.
Searle, J. (1981). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–457.
Shoemaker, S. (1969). Time without change. Journal of Philosophy, 66(12), 363–381.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford University Press.
Sorensen, R. (1992). Thought experiments. Oxford University Press.
Sorensen, R. (2016). Thought Experiments and Imagination. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Imagination. Routledge
Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433–460.
van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, B. (2004). Morality, fiction, and possibility. Philosophers’ Imprint, 4(3), 1–27.
Wirling, Y. S. (2020). Non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality: Strong and weak. Analytic
Philosophy, 61(2), 152–173.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
53(1), 1–42.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
123
